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Abstract
Deep neural networks are vulnerable against adversar-
ial examples. In this paper, we propose to train and test
the networks with randomly subsampled images with high
drop rates. We show that this approach significantly im-
proves robustness against adversarial examples in all cases
of bounded L0, L2 and L∞ perturbations, while reducing
the standard accuracy by a small value. We argue that sub-
sampling pixels can be thought to provide a set of robust
features for the input image and, thus, improves robustness
without performing adversarial training.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable against
adversarial examples, inputs that are intentionally designed
to cause the model to make a mistake [1]. One particular
type of adversarial examples for image classifiers is slightly
perturbed images that are misclassified by the model, but
are recognizable to humans [2, 3]. Such adversarial images
are typically generated by adding a small perturbation with
bounded L0, L2 or L∞ norm to legitimate inputs [4].
Several methods have been proposed for defending
against adversarial examples, but later broken using adap-
tive iterative attacks [5, 6]. The state-of-the-art defense
against adversarial examples (with bounded L∞ perturba-
tion) is adversarial training, which iteratively generates ad-
versarial examples and trains the model to classify them cor-
rectly [7, 8]. This approach, however, significantly slows
down the training process and does not properly scale to
large datasets [9].
Adversarial training is shown to improve robustness at
the cost of reducing accuracy [8]. In [10], Tsipras et al., ar-
gued that the trade-off between adversarial robustness and
standard generalization is a fundamental property of ma-
chine learning classifiers. They analyzed a binary classifica-
tion problem and showed that the reduction in standard ac-
curacy is due to the tendency of adversarially trained mod-
els to assign non-zero weights only to a small number of
strongly-correlated or “robust” features. That is, such net-
Figure 1: Examples of original and subsampled images
with drop rate of 90%. (First and Third Rows) Images
from GTSRB and CIFAR10 datasets, respectively, (Sec-
ond and Fourth Rows) Corresponding subsampled images.
The accuracy on subsampled images reduces by about 4%
and 11% compared to original images for GTSRB and CI-
FAR10 datasets, respectively.
works discard the weakly-correlated (non-robust) features
that could potentially lead to better standard generalization.
In this paper, we investigate how this insight could be
used to train robust classifiers without performing adversar-
ial training. In natural image classifiers, it is not possible to
identify a fixed set of robust features in pixel domain due
to the position invariance of objects. As a result, the set of
robust features would be different for each image. To adapt
the idea of selecting robust features to natural images, we
use a slightly different notion of robust features as features
that are strongly-correlated with output given all other ro-
bust features. In other words, instead of selecting features
that are each highly correlated with output, we select the set
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of features that has the highest correlation.
Image data contain high redundancy due to the strong
correlation between neighboring pixels, i.e., it is possible to
restore images even when a large fraction of pixels is re-
moved [11, 12]. Therefore, conditioned on that a pixel is
selected, its surrounding pixels are weakly-correlated with
output, because they significantly overlap in content with
the center pixel and removing them will not cause much re-
duction in accuracy. Hence, one straightforward approach
to construct robust features is by downsampling image pix-
els. Since farther pixels have smaller correlation, they non-
trivially contribute to model’s prediction and, thus, are con-
sidered to be robust features.
We propose to perform random (nonuniform) sampling
in order to improve both accuracy and robustness. Random
subsampling of pixels improves standard generalization be-
cause the model will be trained with different subsets of
pixels of each image. Also, at inference time, the accuracy
can be improved by averaging the prediction over multi-
ple sampling patterns. Moreover, since the randomness is
not known to the adversary, it further mitigates the attack
success rate. Randomly dropping pixels is suited to defend
against adversarial examples with bounded L0 perturbation,
since the model learns to recognize objects from images
with missing pixels. Nevertheless, we show that it provides
robustness against adversarial examples with bounded L2
and L∞ perturbation as well.
In this paper, we present our preliminary work and re-
sults on using random subsampling for adversarial robust-
ness. Our contributions are summarized in the following.
• We show image classifiers can be trained with inputs
with reduced redundancy, through random subsam-
pling of pixels, without significant reduction in accu-
racy. We show that the best results are obtained when
the model is trained with subsampled images with drop
rates chosen randomly in [0, 1].
• We apply the interpretability methods on models
trained with subsampled images and argue that such
approaches cannot explain how the model recognizes
images from few pixels. We also visualize convolu-
tional filters of the first layer of the network and show
that, in this respect, the model behaves similar to a net-
work trained using adversarial training.
• We evaluate adversarial robustness of the models
trained with random subsamled images. Experiments
are performed on GTSRB and CIFAR10 datasets and
with projected gradient descent (PGD) attack [13].
We show that training with subsampled images with
drop rates chosen randomly in [0, 1] improves the ro-
bustness against adversarial examples in all cases of
bounded L0, L2 and L∞ perturbation.
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Figure 2: Accuracy of models trained with subsampled images
with different drop rates. We used ResNet-20 and ResNet-110 for
GTSRB and CIFAR10, respectively. Dropping pixels at a higher
rate results in lower accuracy. However, even at very high drop
rates, the accuracy remains high.
2. Training with Subsampling Pixels
Natural images are high-dimensional data with high re-
dundancy due to the strong correlation between neighbor-
ing pixels. Hence, when training image classifiers, we can
potentially reduce the redundancy without significantly re-
ducing the standard accuracy. One approach for reducing
redundancy is randomly dropping pixels at a high rate. In
the following, we provide the results of training and testing
models with images with missing pixels.
Let X ∈ [−1, 1]d×d×3 be a color image. Let M ∈
{0, 1}d×d×3 be a mask with the same size as X , where
Mi,j,k is a Bernoulli random variable with mean 1− r, i.e.,
elements of M are equal to 0 with probability r and equal
to 1 otherwise. We generate the subsampled image X ′ as
X ′ = M ◦ X , where ◦ denotes Hadamard (element-wise)
multiplication. Figure 1 shows samples of original im-
ages of German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GT-
SRB) [14] and CIFAR10 dataset [15] and their correspond-
ing subsampled images with drop rate of 90%.
2.1. Experimental Results
We use ResNet-20 and ResNet-110 architectures [16]
for GTSRB and CIFAR10 datasets, respectively. The mod-
els are trained and tested with subsampled images. During
training, the mask is chosen randomly and differently for
each image and at each epoch. Figure 2 shows accuracy of
models trained with images with different drop rates. As ex-
pected, dropping pixels at a higher rate results in lower ac-
curacy. However, even at very high drop rates, the accuracy
remains high. Specifically, compared to standard training,
at drop rate of 90% the accuracy reduces by only about 4%
and 13% for GTSRB and CIFAR10 datasets, respectively.
We also observed that deeper networks perform better.
Table 1 shows the accuracy of ResNet models with differ-
Table 1: Results on CIFAR10 dataset. In experiment 1, model is
trained and tested with original images. In experiment 2, models
are trained and tested with subsampled images with drop rate of
90%. In experiment 3, model is trained with subsampled images
with drop rates chosen uniformly in [0, 1] and tested on subsam-
pled images with drop rate of 90%.
Model Accuracy
Experiment 1 (ResNet-110) 93.9%
Experiment 2 (ResNet-20) 75.2%
Experiment 2 (ResNet-56) 79.4%
Experiment 2 (ResNet-110) 81.1%
Experiment 3 (ResNet-110) 83.0%
ent depths on CIFAR10 images with drop rate of 90%. As
can be seen, ResNet-110 provides about 2% and 6% higher
accuracy compared to ResNet-56 and ResNet-20, respec-
tively. Moreover, the model achieves best results when the
drop rate of each image is chosen randomly between 0%
and 100% at each epoch.
2.2. Interpretability Analysis
In recent years, several “post-hoc” methods have been
proposed for interpreting the predictions of deep convo-
lutional neural networks [17, 18, 19, 20]. Such methods
typically identify input dimensions that the output is most
sensitive to. Let X be the input image, F be the classi-
fier and E be the explanation function that maps inputs
to objects of the same shape. Most explanation meth-
ods are based on some form of the gradient of the clas-
sifier function with respect to input [21]. In our analysis,
we use magnitude of gradient as the explanation map, i.e.,
E(X) = |∂F (X)/∂X| [17].
We examine the interpretability for a ResNet-110 net-
work trained with subsampled CIFAR10 images with drop
rates chosen randomly in [0, 1]. Figure 3a shows explana-
tion maps E(X) and E(X ′) for original and subsampled
images, respectively. For original images, the explanation
map is similar to the pattern of edges in image, a phe-
nomenon that [21] also observed and posed as a shortcom-
ing of interpretability methods. For subsampled images,
however, the explanation is not informative. We visualize
E(X ′)◦M and E(X ′)◦ (1−M), which respectively show
the gradient magnitude at pixels that have been dropped and
those that are not dropped. As can be seen, most of larger
values of gradient are at positions of dropped pixels, i.e.,
pixels that do not contribute to the model prediction.
The results raise questions about the usability of such
techniques in explaining model predictions. The gradient
captures the sensitivity of the model output with respect to
its input, i.e., it quantifies how much a change in a small
neighborhood around the input would change the predic-
𝑿 𝑿′ = 𝑿 ∘𝑴𝑬 𝑿 𝑬 𝑿′ 𝑬 𝑿′ ∘ 𝑴 𝑬 𝑿′ ∘ 𝟏 −𝑴
(a) Model is trained with images with drop rates chosen randomly in [0, 1].
(b) Model is trained to classify subsampled images with drop rate of
90% into their true label, while mapping original images to uniform
distribution. Accuracy on subsampled images is 78.9%.
(c) Model is trained to classify subsampled images into their true la-
bel, while mapping subsampled noisy images to uniform distribution.
The subsampled noisy images are obtained as X ′ = (X + V ) ◦M ,
where M is sampling mask, V is a random variable that takes values
of {−1, 1} with equal probability and  = 16/255. The drop rate is
90%. Accuracy on subsampled images is 80.9%.
Figure 3: Visualizing explanation maps. Notations: X , X ′ and
M are original and subsampled images and the sampling mask,
respectively. E(X) is the explanation map on X , computed as
E(X) = |∂F (X)/∂X|, and E(X ′) is the explanation on X ′.
The gradient quantifies the sensitivity of model output with respect
to its input. It, however, does not quantify how much each input
dimension contributes to model prediction.
tions F (X). It, however, does not quantify how much
each input dimension contributes to the model prediction.
Specifically, in our case, such interpretability methods do
not explain how the model recognizes the image from few
pixels.
For classifying subsampled images, the network might
implicitly rely on features of original images, i.e., it might
have learned to produce similar representations for origi-
nal and subsampled images. In order to prevent the model
to do so, we train a model to classify subsampled images
into their true label, while mapping original images to uni-
form distribution. This training approach results in a net-
work with accuracy of 78.9% on subsampled images (with
90% drop rate), which is only about 2% less than a model
that is only trained with subsampled images. The results
imply that the network is capable of classifying subsampled
images without actually learning features of natural images.
Figure 3b shows the explanation maps for few images. Sim-
ilar to 3a, the explanations do not provide insights into the
model workflow.
Finally, we train a model to classify subsampled images
and subsampled noisy images differently to investigate to
what extent the network relies on the exact values of sub-
sampled pixels. Specifically, we train the model to clas-
sify subsampled images into their true label, while mapping
subsampled noisy images to uniform distribution. The sub-
sampled noisy images are obtained asX ′ = (X+ V )◦M ,
where M is sampling mask, V is a random variable that
takes values of {−1, 1} with equal probability and  =
16/255. The drop rate is 90%.
Interestingly, the trained model achieves accuracy of
80.9% on subsampled images, which is almost the same
as a model trained only with subsampled images. Fig-
ure 3c shows the explanation maps for few images. For
this model, explanations on original images are not corre-
lated with edge pattern. Also, explanations on subsampled
images are sparser compared to 3a and 3b. Moreover, most
of larger values of gradient are at positions where pixels
have not been dropped. Further exploring interpretability of
networks trained with subsampled images is left for future
work.
2.3. Visualizing Convolutional Filters
Convolutional networks are known to learn basic image
patterns such as edges and blobs in early layers and then
combine them in later layers to distinguish complex ob-
jects [22]. Dropping pixels at a high rate disrupts such ba-
sic patterns. As a result, the network will not be able to
readily extract spatial features of the image data. To gain
insight into how the model classifies inputs, we examine
convolutional filters of the first layer. Figure 4 shows the
visualization of filters of ResNet-110 networks trained with
CIFAR10 dataset. We consider three cases of a normally
trained model, a model trained with subsampled images
with drop rate of 90% and a model trained with subsampled
images with drop rates chosen randomly in [0, 1].
As can be seen, the model that is trained with subsam-
pled images only has filters with large values at center po-
(a) Model is trained normally.
(b) Model is trained with images with drop rate of 90%.
(c) Model is trained with images with drop rates chosen randomly in [0, 1].
Figure 4: Visualizing convolutional filters of first layer of
ResNet-110 networks trained with CIFAR10 dataset. Models
trained with subsampled images have more concentrated weights.
sition. This means that the network recognizes that there is
no spatial correlation between adjacent pixels and, hence,
just passes several scaled versions of the image to the next
layer. Also, the model that is trained with subsampled im-
ages with different drop rates contains a mix of concentrated
filters and other filters similar to the normally trained model.
Interestingly, having concentrated filters in first layer is
also observed in adversarially trained networks on MNIST
dataset, where models were trained with adversarial exam-
ples with bounded L∞ perturbation [8]. The similar behav-
ior of the models trained with the two approaches suggests
that randomly dropping pixels is indeed related to the notion
of robust features observed in adversarial training. Further
exploring this relationship is left for the future work.
3. Robustness to Adversarial Examples
In this section, we first provide a background on adver-
sarial examples and then evaluate the robustness of models
trained with subsampled images.
3.1. Background on Adversarial Examples
We consider a class of adversarial examples for im-
age classifiers where small (imperceptible) perturbation is
added to an image so that the model misclassifies it (mis-
classification attack) or classifies it into the attacker’s de-
sired label (targeted attack). The perturbation is typically
quantified according to an Lp norm. The attacker’s prob-
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Figure 5: Accuracy on adversarial examples of (left) GTSRB and (right) CIFAR10 datasets with bounded L0 perturbation of 0.03D,
where D is the total number of pixels. The threshold of entropy is chosen such that accuracy on clean validation images is 1% less than
the case where each example is tested only once.
lem is formally stated as follows:
min‖X ′ −X‖p, (1)
s.t. f(X ′) 6= y or f(X ′) = yt,
where X and X ′ are the clean and adversarial examples,
respectively, y is the true label and yt 6= y is the attacker’s
desired target label.
We generate adversarial examples using the Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) method [13, 8], such that the
added perturbation is bounded within p for Lp norm, i.e.,
‖X ′ − X‖p ≤ p. PGD is an iterative attack with the fol-
lowing update step:
Xj+1 = ΠX+S(Xj + V j), s.t. ‖V j‖p ≤ ′p, (2)
where Xj is the image at step j, V j is the attack vector at
step j, ′p is the added perturbation per step, and ΠX+S is
the projection operator where S is the set of allowed per-
turbations. According to attack goal, the attack vector is
specified as follows:
• V j = ∇X`(Xj , y), for misclassification attack,
• V j = −∇X`(Xj , yt), for targeted attack.
Attack Setup. To attack a model with random subsam-
pling, we generate 10 randomly subsampled images, for
each one compute the gradient at pixels which have not been
dropped, and then take average of gradients. Let M be the
sampling mask. The average gradient is formally obtained
as follows:
∆ = EM [∇X`(X ◦M,y) ◦M ].
We consider the cases where the L0, L2 or L∞ norm of
perturbation is bounded. For GTSRB, we set 0 = 0.03 D,
where D is the total number of pixels, 2 = 512/255 and
∞ = 32/255. The attack step size is set to ′0 = 1,
′2 = 32/255 and 
′
∞ = 4/255. For CIFAR10, we set
0 = 0.03 D, 2 = 1 and ∞ = 16/255. The attack step
size is also set to ′0 = 1, 
′
2 = 16/255 and 
′
∞ = 2/255.
We perform PGD attack with cross-entropy and CW [4] loss
functions and for misclassification and targeted attacks, and
present the best attack results.
3.2. Case of Bounded L0 Perturbation
Training with random subsampling is suited to defend
against L0 adversarial examples, since the model is trained
to be robust to missing pixels. We also observed that sub-
sampled adversarial examples result in more distributed
output probability vector than subsampled clean images.
Therefore, we enhance the defense mechanism by reject-
ing examples for which the entropy of probability vector is
larger than a threshold. The threshold is chosen so as to
have 1% false positive rate on validation data, i.e., the accu-
racy on clean validation images is reduced by 1%.
With random subsampling, the accuracy can be im-
proved by averaging the output on multiple different sub-
sampled versions of the input. To improve adversarial ro-
bustness, we compute the average output probability vector
over 10 different subsampled inputs and reject the example
if the entropy of probability vector is larger than a threshold.
The threshold is chosen such that accuracy on clean valida-
tion images is 1% less than the case where each example is
run only once.
Figure 5 shows the results on GTSRB and CIFAR10
datasets. As expected, larger drop rate improves adversarial
robustness at the cost of reducing standard accuracy. The
experiments are performed on a single model which has
been trained with images with drop rates in [0, 1]. Such a
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(a) GTSRB, L2 Attack.
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(b) GTSRB, L∞ Attack.
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(c) CIFAR10, L2 Attack.
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(d) CIFAR10, L∞ Attack.
Figure 6: Accuracy on adversarial examples of GTSRB and CI-
FAR10 datasets with bounded L2 and L∞ perturbation.
model has the advantage that at test time the drop rate can
be tuned to achieve different levels of trade-offs between
accuracy and robustness.
In Figure 5, it can be also seen that rejecting inputs based
on the value of entropy improves the trade-off of accuracy
and robustness, since the adversarial accuracy is increased
by larger value than the 1% reduction in standard accuracy.
Moreover, averaging over 10 runs and rejecting inputs with
high entropy results in adversarial accuracy to be on par
with standard accuracy at high drop rates.
3.3. Case of Bounded L2 and L∞ Perturbation
Figure 6 shows the attack results for L2 and L∞ cases
for GTSRB and CIFAR10 datasets. As can be seen, random
subsampling improves robustness in both cases and, similar
to L0 case, larger drop rate results in higher adversarial ro-
bustness. Intuitively, for attacking the model, the adversary
needs to distribute their budget to all features in such a way
that the expected attack success rate is maximized. This will
reduce the attack effectiveness compared to the case that the
attacker knows the exact sampling pattern.
4. Related Work
Defenses against adversarial examples with bounded Lp
perturbation have been widely studied [7, 4, 5, 8, 6, 23]. Ad-
versarial training is the state-of-the-art approach for L2 and
L∞ cases, but is shown to significantly slow down the train-
ing procedure [8, 10]. While most papers studied defenses
in L∞ setting, some of real-world attacks based on adver-
sarial examples fit in the L0 setting [24, 25]. For exam-
ple, [24] attacked traffic sign detection algorithms by adding
sticker-like perturbation to images. Also, [25] showed face
recognition algorithms can be fooled by adding physically-
realizable perturbation such as eyeglasses to images.
In [26], the authors proposed a method for improving
robustness in L0 attack setting by exploiting the sparsity
of natural images in Fourier domain. They showed attack
results on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets and men-
tioned that the sparsity property might not hold in large im-
ages. Similar to their method, we used a property of natural
images, namely high spatial correlation, to mitigate the ef-
fect of adversarial perturbation. Our approach is, however,
general to natural images of any size. In fact, with larger
images, it is possible to drop pixels at a higher rate and still
restore the image [11, 12]. Hence, the classifier might be
able to recognize subsampled images with higher drop rates
and, as a result, achieve better robustness. Moreover, our
method improves the robustness against L2 and L∞ adver-
sarial examples in addition to the L0 case. As a future work,
we will implement our method on Imagenet dataset.
Several papers have proposed using post-processing
algorithms to increase adversarial robustness [27, 28].
In [27], the authors proposed applying random resizing and
padding at inference time. [28] presented an algorithm for
pruning a random subset of activations of a pretrained net-
works and scaling up the rest. Unlike our method, such
algorithms do not train the model to learn the randomness.
Introducing randomness to inputs or the network itself at
both training and test times is recently explored and shown
to improve performance on adversarial examples [29, 30].
In [29], the authors proposed adding random noise layers
to the network and ensembling the prediction over random
noises. [30] adopted similar idea and used differential pri-
vacy to provide certified robustness against adversarial per-
turbations. In this paper, we proposed to train the model
with subsampled images, with the drop rates randomly cho-
sen in [0, 1], and test it with subsampled images with high
drop rates. We showed that our method improves adversar-
ial robustness in all cases of L0, L2 and L∞ perturbations.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that image classifiers can be
trained to recognize images with high drop rates. We then
proposed to train models with subsampled images with drop
rates randomly chosen in [0, 1]. Our experimental results
on GTSRB and CIFR10 datasets showed that such models
improve the robustness against adversarial examples in all
cases of L0, L2 and L∞ perturbation, while reducing stan-
dard accuracy by a small value.
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